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THOMAS

M.

GAA*

Harmonization of International
Bankruptcy Law and Practice:
Is It Necessary? Is It Possible?**
I. Everyone Is for Harmonization-Whatever It Is

"Harmonization of international insolvency and bankruptcy law and practice'--the words alone conjure up images of international cooperation that have
an immediate appeal in the post-Cold War period.' In fact, there long has been
a consensus among commentators that increased cooperation in international
*J.D., 1980, University of Montana; LL.M, 1987, International and Comparative Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Mr. Gaa is associated with Brooks & Raub, Palo Alto, California. He
is vice-chair, International Creditors Rights and Bankruptcy Committee, Section of International Law
and Practice, American Bar Association.
**An earlier version ofthis article was published as part ofthe program materials entitled "International
Law and Practice in a Changing World," prepared for the Spring 1993 Meeting of the ABA Section of
International Law and Practice. The author wishes to thank Don Wallace, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center, and Of Counsel at Sherman and Sterling, for his comments on this subject.
1. This article employs the phrase "international insolvency and bankruptcy law and practice"
to refer to both out-of-court workouts and judicial proceedings in which more than one state's municipal
laws affect the debtor and its assets. This phrase emphasizes the dynamic interaction of national
legal systems that Judge Jessup defined as "transnational" law in which "[b]oth public and private
international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into standard categories."
PHILIP C. JESSUP, STORRS LECTURES, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956), quoted in HENRY J. STEINER
& DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 11 (1968). Commentators in this area also
refer to "international insolvency" problems, "multinational bankruptcies," "cross-border insolvencies," or "transnational bankrupties." See, e.g., Richard A. Gitlin & Ronald J. Silverman, International Insolvency and the Maxwell Communication CorporationCase: One Example of Progress in
the 1990's, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL STRATEGIES (PLI No. 628,
1992); Alan L. Gropper, The Bankruptcy Code's Approach To MultinationalBankruptcies: Basic
Legal Framework, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL STRATEGIES (PLI
No. 628, 1992); Selinda A. Melnick, Cross-BorderInsolvencies: The United States Perspective-A
Primer, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL STRATEGIES (PLI No. 628,
1992); Harvey R. Miller & Larren M. Nashelsky, TransnationalBankruptcy and Reorganization
Cases: HistoricalAntecedents and Looming Problems, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: RESTRUCTURING AND WORKOUTS IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE FAILURES (Miller & Prior eds., 1993).
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insolvency and bankruptcy matters is essential to promoting international com-

merce and trade.'
In contrast, there is no consensus about what is meant by "harmonization."
Should, for example, the goal of harmonization be the creation of a supranational
bankruptcy system that accords jurisdiction in international bankruptcy cases to
a supranational bankruptcy court, which then displaces the bankruptcy courts of
the states affected?3 Likewise, should municipal bankruptcy laws be displaced by
a supranational bankruptcy law applicable in such cases? Is there any interest in
this approach among the consumers of any such system-that is, would this system
be considered advantageous by the international business community? Would

states have any reason to concede their economic, legal, and political jurisdiction
in this area to a supranational court?
Should the goal of harmonization be less exalted? Should instead harmonization
seek to allocate jurisdiction in such cases among the bankruptcy courts of the
states affected and to rationalize the selection of the applicable law in such cases?
Should developments in this area continue on a case-by-case basis, the so-called
ad hoc approach through which an "international common law of bankruptcy"
is evolving? Or should governments undertake to negotiate bilateral or multilateral

bankruptcy treaties that allocate jurisdiction among states, identify applicable
procedural and substantive laws, and accommodate the public policies of each
state's municipal bankruptcy laws? In practical terms, can this level of harmonization satisfy the practical needs of the participants in such cases for predictability

2. See, e.g., Gitlin &Silverman, supranote 1; Stefan A. Riesenfeld, TransnationalBankruptcies
in the Late Eighties:A Tale ofEvolution and Atavism, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY 409 (David S.
Clark ed., 1990); Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The International Void in the Law of
Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAW. 307 (1987); John Honsberger, The Negotiation of a
Bankruptcy Treaty, reprintedin 1985 MEREDITH MEMORIAL LECTURES 288 (1986); J.H. DALHUISEN,
DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY § 2.04[5], at 3-260 (1986); Kurt H.

Nadelmann, CreditorEqualityin Inter-StateBankruptcies:A Requisite of Uniformity in the Regulation
of Bankruptcy, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1949-50) [hereinafter cited as Nadelmann, CreditorEquality];
and Kurt H. Nadelmann, Bankruptcy Treaties, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 58, 68-70 (1944) [hereinafter
Nadelmann, Treaties].
3. This article adopts the term "states" to refer to sovereign political entities, including the
United States of America. See Gitlin & Flaschen, InternationalVoid, 42 Bus. LAW. at 307 n.3. The
term "international" in this article should be understood to refer to all states and not only to European
and other states generally considered to be Western countries. Despite the conviction that efforts in
this area should include other major and emerging trading countries and areas, the literature in this
area largely, if not entirely, still focuses on cooperation among European states, states comprising
the British Commonwealth, the United States, and South American states. Whether this paucity of
information concerning other states reflects a lack of concern for bankruptcy cooperation in such
states and their legal traditions, an absence of significant international insolvency problems involving
these states, or merely a culturally insular perspective, is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless,
the author believes that further inquiry into these issues would be productive given the scope of trade
between European states and states in the Western Hemisphere, on the one hand, and states in Asia,
and the prospective trade with states in Oceania, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and the
states that are emerging from the remnants of the Soviet Union or the other.
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of results, efficient administration and equitable distribution of estate assets, and
finality of results? In essence, can this harmonization increase the likelihood that
bankruptcy judgments will be recognized and enforced by foreign states?
In conjunction with either of these approaches, should the international legal
community draft model bankruptcy codes for enactment by states in the process of
abandoning command economies and embracing market economies, and thereby
introduce uniformity in municipal bankruptcy laws? If so, who should participate
in these efforts and what organizations should sponsor them? Would such uniformity necessarily harmonize international bankruptcy law and practice at least for
the states enacting these model bankruptcy codes?
Despite a lack of consensus concerning the most effective means to promote
harmonization, the history of international commercial insolvencies indicates that
creditors long have recognized that failure to cooperate in resolving an immediate
financial crisis will adversely affect any recovery on their claims. 4 In response
to international economic crises caused by the inability of debtors in one state to
satisfy obligations owed to creditors in another state, European states over the
last several hundred years have attempted to assist their citizens by promoting
cooperation in insolvency and bankruptcy matters. Since at least 1204 European
states have attempted to ameliorate international insolvency problems by entering
into bankruptcy treaties that address problems such as jurisdiction over debtors,
the efficient administration of bankruptcy estates, and the transfer of assets to
one state for distribution to creditors.5 Although bankruptcy treaty solutions to
international bankruptcy and insolvency problems have been attempted on many
occasions, only a limited number of treaties are now in force. 6
In addition, when the economic failure of a debtor in one state portends disaster
on an international scale, states have recognized that failure to cooperate with one
another also will have serious adverse effects on their major financial institutions
7
and risk significant disruption to international commercial and political relations.
Today, the failure of the United States and its major trading partners to create
a system that promotes resolution of international bankruptcy and insolvency
problems efficiently, equitably, and predictably could have significant economic
4. As discussed in more detail in the following sections of this article, the intervention of Pope
Boniface in the resolving the collapse of the Ammanati bank in 1302 represents an early attempt by
creditors in several states to cooperate and thereby maximize recovery on their claims. See Nadelmann,
Treaties, supra note 2, at 58-59.

5. See, e.g., id. at 61 nn. 14-15 (references to the treaty between Verona and Trent in 1204
dealing with the transfer of assets, and a treaty between Verona and Venice in 1306); see also
Honsberger, supra note 2, at 288.
6. The most prominent treaties currently in force are the Scandinavian Convention between
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, and the Bustamonte Code, which has been ratified
by 15 Latin American states. See Nadelmann, Treaties, supra note 2, at 68 n.76, 70 n.93. The
European Economic Community (the EEC) failed to draft a Bankruptcy Convention despite attempts
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Recently it has revived these efforts and a second draft convention
is being worked on currently.
7. Nadelmann, Creditor Equality, supra note 2, at 42.
WINTER 1993
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consequences! The observation of one leading commentator made almost fifty
years ago remains a clarion call: "The problems yet unsolved in international
bankruptcy cases are considered a continual threat to and a source of disturbance
in the development of international commercial relations." 9

Today, as proponents of cooperation in international bankruptcy law and practice consider the situation, the observations of one scholar involved in efforts to
harmonize international law merit consideration:
Our times are characterized by a multiplicity of initiatives directed towards the unification or at least the harmonization of national laws.. . .Sometimes the individual conventions and uniform laws aim at a universal application, while others apply only to defined
groups of states or regions. In some instances they seek to replace the corresponding
domestic law completely, while in others their aim is simply to regulate international
relations, the parallel domestic law continuing to regulate purely internal relations.
... Finally, there may be model rules which have no binding force, the introduction
of which into the various national systems is left entirely to the discretion of states.10

But first, before determining whether to pursue an ad hoc approach to harmonization (that is, a case-by-case approach), to negotiate bankruptcy treaties, or

to draft model bankruptcy codes, it is necessary to examine the fundamental
substantive legal issues and practical barriers to harmonization. Therefore, the
remainder of this article discusses the issues that should be considered, the barriers
that must be surmounted, and the approaches that might be followed, in harmoniz-

ing international bankruptcy law and practice.
Nonetheless, in the end, harmonization, like beauty, may be in the eye of the
beholder.
H. The Goals: Predictability, Efficiency, Equity, and Finality

Given the consensus that international insolvency and bankruptcy cooperation
is a laudable and necessary goal, it remains necessary to determine what is meant

by harmonization and what is the most effective means of achieving it. Answering
these questions requires recognition that municipal laws governing debtor and

8. The failure to create an effective mechanism to resolve trade and other commercial disputes
can have significant political consequences, too. For example, one of the criticisms that might be
made of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico is that its
dispute settlement provisions pertain only to disputes regarding interpretation and application of the
NAFTA and to certain disputes involving NAFTA investors. See Description of the Proposed North
American Free Trade Agreement prepared by the Governments of Canada, The United Mexican
States, and the United States of America, Aug. 12, 1992, at 31, 39-40 (pamphlet available from the
office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.). Because the NAFTA does not
address commercial disputes not based upon specific provisions of the Agreement itself, it fails to
provide the results that this article asserts are essential to promoting transnational commercial activity-namely, predictable results in the recognition and enforceability of bankruptcy judgments, efficient administration and equitable distribution of bankruptcy estates, and finality in results.
9. Nadelmann, Treaties, supra note 2, at 60-61.
10. Michael J. Bonell, InternationalUniformLaw in Practice-orWhere the Real TroubleBegins,
38 AM. J.COMp. L. 865.
VOL. 27, NO. 4
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creditor relationships, in particular bankruptcy laws, embody fundamental social
and economic policies. As discussed in more detail in the remainder of this article,
any effort to harmonize international bankruptcy law and practice is doomed if
the advocates of such harmonization fail to understand the fundamental social and
economic policies fulfilled by the municipal bankruptcy laws of the various states
that will be affected.
Municipal bankruptcy law is based upon a simple truth-some businesses and
commercial transactions will fail, and consequently, some obligations will not be
satisfied in full. The response to this truth-that is whether the municipal law
emphasizes creditors' rights or encourages rehabilitation of businesses and accords a debtor a fresh start, or seeks a balance between these policies-depends
upon the social values and economic policies of that society. For example, because
economic risk-taking is believed to benefit a market economy, the bankruptcy
laws of the United States represent a clear policy to avoid liquidation, to retain
the going-concern value of businesses, to protect employees' jobs, and to afford
debtors a fresh start by granting a discharge of prebankruptcy debts."
Regardless of the particular social and economic policies embodied in the
municipal bankruptcy laws of the participants in an international bankruptcy case,
these creditors and debtors desire the same outcomes as they would seek in a
purely domestic bankruptcy case-that is, predictability of results (enforcement
of bankruptcy court judgments by foreign courts), efficient administration of the
estate and its equitable distribution, and finality of result. Likewise, although they
may desire different substantive results in any particular instance, both creditors
and debtors benefit from the equitable treatment of claims and the general benefits
of the national bankruptcy laws and policies with which they are familiar.
The success of efforts to harmonize international bankruptcy law and practice,
by whatever means, must be measured by the extent to which such efforts increase
the likelihood that these shared goals will be realized. Realization of these goals,
in turn, requires identification of the issues that must be resolved and the barriers
that must be overcome in this process.
M11.Fundamental Issues and Barriers to Harmonization of International
Bankruptcy Law and Practice
The success of any effort to harmonize international bankruptcy law and practice will turn on the handling of issues such as the recognition and enforcement
of bankruptcy adjudications, the accommodation of fundamental economic and
social policies underpinning different municipal bankruptcy laws, and the consideration of economic issues that may encourage or discourage interest in harmoni11. See NLBR v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984). See also Gitlin & Flaschen,
supra note 2; Nadelmann, RehabilitationInternationalBankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt
and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. (1976) [hereinafter Nadelmann, Herstatt]; Nadelmann, Creditor
Equality, supra note 2.
WINTER 1993
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zation. Likewise, unless certain practical barriers are overcome, any effort to
harmonize the law in this area will be frustrated.
A.

RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGMENTS

In a fundamental and very practical sense, creditors in any bankruptcy or
insolvency case seek to maximize recovery on their claims at the lowest transactional cost. Similarly, debtors seek to maximize the benefits available to them
under the bankruptcy laws (such as obtaining a discharge of prebankruptcy obligations and restructuring their obligations) at the lowest transactional cost to them.

Although these fundamental objectives of creditors and debtors remain unchanged
in an international bankruptcy case, their realization may be adversely affected
if bankruptcy judgments entered by one state's courts are not recognized and

enforced in jurisdictions other than the adjudicating jurisdiction. Unfortunately, as
one leading commentator has observed, "in general the complexity of bankruptcy
proceedings and their far-reaching consequences for debtors and creditors alike
often appear to undermine any attempt at developing generally satisfactory rules

concerning recognition and execution of foreign bankruptcies."1 2 Nonetheless,
unless a means is found to increase the likelihood that bankruptcy adjudications
will be recognized and enforced, harmonization has limited, if any, significance.

Therefore, the paramount concern for any effort to harmonize international
bankruptcy law and practice is whether bankruptcy adjudications by one state's
courts will be recognized and enforced by foreign courts. Generally, a court's
decision to recognize and to enforce a foreign bankruptcy judgment is based upon
its determination that the adjudicating court had jurisdiction over the parties and

subject matter that is the subject of the judgment, that it applied the proper law
(including choice of law rules) to the matter before it, and that fundamental public

policies of the enforcing state will not be compromised by enforcement of the
judgment.' 3
12. DALHUISEN, supra note 2, § 2.0114][b], at 3-124. For a review of the problems associated
with recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments in other states, see Matthew Adler, Should the
United States Negotiate a Treaty on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, Draft Report
of the American Bar Association, Section of International Law and Practice 4 (unpublished manuscript). This Draft Report should be published in Summer 1993. Prior to the Draft Report's publication,
Matthew Adler, Esq., made it available to this author. The conclusions and opinions expressed in
the Draft Report are Mr. Adler's alone. Conversation with Matthew Adler (May 5, 1993).
13. See generally DALHUISEN, supra note 2, §§ 2.01 etseq. For example, a U.S. court may deny
recognition and enforcement of a foreign bankruptcy court judgment if it concludes that the foreign
proceeding does not accord U.S. creditors certain due process protections, even though the foreign
judgment was made in compliance with applicable foreign bankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)
(1988); Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988),
aff'd, 878 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1989). Similarly, an English court may consider the effect of ajudgment
on its local creditors in determining whether to recognize and enforce a bankruptcy judgment issued
by an American court. See Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines, Inc., [1989] 1 Q.B. 360;
see also DALHUlSaN, supra note 2, § 1.01, at 3-1 to -8; Gerhard Kegel, FundamentalApproaches,
in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, VOL. II, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
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1. The Exercise of Jurisdiction
The first barrier to recognition and enforcement of a bankruptcy judgment
is the exercise of "excess" jurisdiction on the part of the adjudicating court.
Essentially, municipal bankruptcy laws permit courts either to exercise territorial
jurisdiction over debtors and their assets or to assert extraterritorial (worldwide)
jurisdiction over the assets of any debtor eligible for relief under its bankruptcy
laws. The United States Bankruptcy Code, for example, grants U.S. bankruptcy
courts worldwide jurisdiction over the debtor and all of the bankruptcy estate's
property. This expansive grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction may be utilized by
a foreign debtor to assert the automatic stay granted under United States bankruptcy law to protect its assets outside the territory of the United States, even
though the law of the situs of the property would offer no such protection. 14
Despite the utility of this universal jurisdiction from the perspective of a debtor
involved in an international bankruptcy case, it nearly guarantees that jurisdictional disputes will arise in many international bankruptcy cases. At least one
commentator believes that international insolvency and bankruptcy problems are
"exacerbated by the affirmative declaration by many nations in their insolvency
laws that their laws apply extraterritorially. "15As a matter of policy, most states
assert that "local bankruptcy laws should be applied universally but that foreign
laws should be given only limited (if any) extraterritorial recognition, [and that]
lies at the very heart of the difficulty in attaining international bankruptcy cooperation.'1 6 As a practical matter, the complex and contradictory orders that might
ensue if the debtor is the subject of two primary bankruptcy cases in which
both courts assert such universal jurisdiction are not difficult to imagine. If, for
example, two courts assert worldwide jurisdiction over the debtor's assets and its
estate, the debtor could be subject to contradictory substantive bankruptcy laws
that subject certain property to differential treatment.
The complex issues posed by such assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction
ch. 3 (Kurt Lipstein ed., 1986) [hereinafter

ENCYCLOPEDIA VOL. M] (issued under the auspices of
the International Association of Legal Science) (emphasizing that the adjudicating court must have
had jurisdiction if its judgment is to be enforced by a foreign court).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (1988) (the district court, in a case commenced under title 11 of
the United States Code, has "exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the
debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate"). For an application of
this extraterritorial jurisdiction, see In re Maruko, Inc., Case No. SD-and the capability of the
automatic stay to prevent foreclosure of a Japanese debtor's property in Australia, 91-12303-LM 11
(Bankr. S.D. Cal.) (pending). Maruko is discussed in Arnold M. Quittner, Cross-Border Insolvencies:
Concurrent Japanese and United States Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES: DEVELOPING
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES 33 (PLI No. 628, 1992).
15. See also Gitlin & Silverman, supra note 1, at 11 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988) (the debtor's
estate includes property "wherever located and by whomever held") and English Insolvency Act
1986, § 436 (the debtor's estate includes property "wherever situated")); DALHUISEN, supra note
2, § 2.03[1], at 3-172.3.
16. Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 2, at 309 (citing DALHUISEN, supra note 2, § 2.03[3], at
3-190.2).
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often are resolved on an ad hoc basis.' 7 Although these issues may be resolved
satisfactorily on an ad hoc basis for the parties in a particular case, any such
solution will have limited, if any, precedential effect on future cases. At best,
such solutions now may be advanced only as part of an evolving "international
common law of bankruptcy" that has become customary international law through
usage and convention. Consequently, any court is free to ignore such solutions
and determine the issues on any basis permitted under its municipal laws.
It is precisely these jurisdictional issues, which occupy significant time and
effort in large international bankruptcy cases, that may be more efficiently resolved in bilateral and multilateral bankruptcy treaties.18 Additionally, resolving
these jurisdictional issues through the treaty process has the benefit of reducing
the transactional costs and risks associated with failed international commercial
transactions and increasing the predictability of results in terms of the recognition
and enforcement of bankruptcy adjudications.
2. Application of Private InternationalLaw
The second factor generally considered by a court in determining whether to
recognize and enforce a bankruptcy judgment is whether the adjudicating court
applied the proper law to the issues decided. 9 Selection of the proper law is
the province of private international law, which always includes the rules that
determine when the private law of the lex fori, as opposed to the foreign private
law, is applicable.20 Under traditional conflicts of laws rules, if foreign substantive
law of a private law nature is the proper law, its application flows from the
command of the private international law of the lex fori. Or, as Lord Mansfield
said: "[E]very action tried here must be tried by the law of England, but the law
of England says that in a variety of circumstances ...the laws of the country
where the cause of action arose shall govern.',21
In contrast, contemporary notions of private international law consider it to be
a series of rules that seek to do justice between conflicting interests. This pragmatic
approach employs an inductive process that relies on the facts and the existing
law that render its rules more subtle.22 It seeks to regulate international situations
in accordance with justice, and in theory domestic and foreign private law are to
be applied according to the same rules-that is, they are entitled to equal treatment.
This view has been labeled "Practical Internationalism. ,23
Unfortunately, this contemporary approach may lead to an inability to assure

17. See generally Gitlin & Silverman, supra note 1.
18. Nadelmann, Treaties, supra note 2, at 71.
19. DALHUISEN, supra note 2, §§ 1.01, 2.01.
20. Kegel, supra note 13, at 3.
21. Id. at 10 (quoting Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343 (1775), 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121
(1775)).
22. Id.at 12.
23. Id.at 13 n.117.
VOL. 27, NO. 4
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that the adjudicating court applied the proper law to the issues before it. In
essence, this legal relativism may provide a ready reason to deny recognition
and enforcement of a bankruptcy adjudication by an enforcing court. As one
commentator notes, "[p]rivate international law ... in the field of bankruptcy
and insolvency is undoubtedly defective and inadequate.- 2 4 This perceived inadequacy of private international law is one of the fundamental reasons that some
commentators assert that bankruptcy treaties between trading partners are the
only means to assure recognition and enforcement of bankruptcy judgments. 2"
As a result of this uncertainty, the cause of harmonizing international bankruptcy laws and practice may be advanced by negotiating a treaty that deals
directly with selection of the proper law to apply in a given circumstance. Private
international law, then, disappears as a possible bar to recognition and enforcement of bankruptcy adjudications. Likewise, to the extent that uniform bankruptcy
laws are enacted by the states involved in an international case, this issue becomes
moot. As a result, private international law only survives in relation to countries
that do not take part in unification by ratifying a treaty or enacting the pertinent
model laws.26
3. Protection of FundamentalPublic Policy
Finally, a court may decline to recognize and enforce a foreign bankruptcy
judgment if it determines that a public policy of the forum would be violated by
enforcement of the judgment. Predicting whether enforcement of a particular
judgment would violate a public policy of the enforcing state requires an understanding of the conceptual basis of that state's bankruptcy laws. Three distinct
conceptual approaches to bankruptcy laws have evolved: the judgment approach,
the creditor's rights approach, and the general assignment for the benefit of
creditors approach. Each approach embodies fundamental public policies concerning the nature of debtor/creditor relations and the proper role of the bankruptcy process, and these policies are interwoven in the fabric of a state's legal
system.
The judgment theory conceptualizes bankruptcy as a process that essentially
confirms or creates specific legal relationships of a private nature. This concept
of bankruptcy is difficult to reconcile with modern reorganization approaches,
such as chapter 11 in the United States Bankruptcy Code, because of the emphasis
in reorganization laws on limiting creditors' rights and personal liability of directors and managers of the debtor. These modern reorganization laws represent a
public policy concern that negates, to some degree, the private law character of
insolvency under the judgment approach. 27
24. Honsberger, supra note 2, at 289 (quoting Muir Hunter, The Draft Bankruptcy Convention
of the European Economic Communities, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 682, 685-86 (1972)).
25. Id. at 289 n.8 (quoting Hunter, supra note 24).
26. Kegel, supra note 13, at 26, 31.
27. DALHUISEN, supra note 2, § 2.01[l], at 3-100 to -101.
WINTER 1993
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In contrast, the creditors' rights approach is intended to satisfy accumulated
debts rather than determine the rights and obligations of the parties under private
law. Fundamental to this approach is the notion that bankruptcy is a provisional
remedy intended to preserve the estate until the rights of the creditors are ascertained, the estate's assets determined, and decisions made whether to liquidate or
reorganize the debtor. The essence of this approach is the simultaneous maturity
of all prebankruptcy claims and their satisfaction under nonbankruptcy law (subject to any limits imposed by the bankruptcy laws).2"
The creditors' rights approach also has been modified in varying degrees by
many modem bankruptcy laws to promote rehabilitation of the debtor rather than
emphasizing its straight liquidation.29 The reorganization provisions of Chapter
11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, for example, articulate an unambiguous
policy "to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss
of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources.'"'° In light of the popular
belief held by many non-U.S. lawyers and businessmen (and, perhaps, by their
counterparts in the United States) that chapter 11 cases are inefficient and unfairly
favor a debtor's equity ownership and management over its creditors,3M non-U.S.
courts may be reluctant to enforce bankruptcy orders entered by U.S. bankruptcy
courts if the rights of non-U.S. creditors (under non-U.S. law) have been compromised by the adjudication under the United States Bankruptcy Code.32
Finally, a general assignment of property conceptual approach to bankruptcy
laws tends to prevail in common law states. Although the essential simplicity of
this approach appears to be an advantage, it also has been modified by modem
notions of reorganization of debtors.
The importance of understanding the distinct social and economic policies
vindicated by each conceptual approach cannot be underestimated because they
determine whether a state is predisposed to recognize and enforce foreign bankruptcy adjudications. 33 For example, one leading commentator has observed that
bankruptcy laws based upon either the judgment theory or the assignment for the
benefit of creditors theory are more likely to permit recognition and enforcement
of foreign bankruptcies, while the public policy aspect of the creditors' rights

28. Id. § 2.01[2], at 3-104 to -112.
29. Id. § 2.01[3], at 3-112 to -116.
30. See NLBR v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984); see also Gitlin & Flaschen,
supra note 2; Nadelmann, Herstat, supra note 11, at 1; Nadelmann, CreditorEquality, supra note
2. The variation in permitting rehabilitations rather than liquidations of debtors as a solution to
insolvency may be attributed to distinct historical, cultural, and legal traditions, and attitudes of
financial institutions in different countries. Likewise, the actual incidence in utilization of rehabilitation provisions also may vary depending upon such factors. What effect, if any, the NAFTA negotiated
between Canada, the United States, and Mexico will have on this disparity in rehabilitation prospects
under Mexican law, Canadian law, and U.S. law is unknown.
31. See Bankruptcy: When Firms Go Bust, ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1992, at 63.
32. DALHUISEN, supra note 2, at 3-116 n.10a.
33. Id. § 2.01, at 3-100 to -129.
VOL. 27, NO. 4
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approach to bankruptcy raises a significant barrier against recognition and enforcement of foreign bankruptcies. 4 As a general rule, if the conceptual basis of
the bankruptcy laws of an adjudicating state and an enforcing state differ significantly and are in conflict, one may expect that the enforcing court may be more
inclined to refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign bankruptcy judgment. 35
4. Recognition and Enforcement of Bankruptcy Adjudications
Under U.S. Law
The general consensus of American commentators is that proponents of foreign
judgments traditionally have received favorable treatment in American courts
concerning recognition and enforcement of their foreign judgments. 36 Additionally, the United States Bankruptcy Code affords foreign representatives of bankruptcy estates the right to commence an ancillary proceeding to assist in administration of a foreign bankruptcy estate (for example, where it has assets in the
United States) or to commence a full bankruptcy case under U.S. bankruptcy law.
Despite this relatively open access to the U.S. bankruptcy court system, disputes
between bankruptcy courts in the United States and other countries remain a
serious barrier to effective harmonization. This situation simply highlights the
complexity of achieving harmonization in this field.
Although the U.S. law concerning recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments adheres to the general rules described above, courts in the United States
also consider whether notions of international comity require recognition and
enforcement of a judgment at issue.37 A foreign judgment will be recognized and
enforced by a U.S. court if the proponent of the judgment is able to show that
the adjudicating court had proper subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over
the parties, timely and proper notice of the proceedings was given, and the
judgment debtor had an opportunity to present a defense to an unbiased tribunal. 38
34. Id. § 2.01[4][a]. As Dalhuisen notes, although the creditors' rights approach isbeing modified
by modem notions of rehabilitation and reorganization of debtors, it retains its public policy nexus
that, itself, may present a barrier to recognition and enforcement of foreign bankruptcies.

35. Id. § 2.0114], at 3-124.
36. See generally Adler, supra note 12; Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition and Enforcement ofForeignAdjudications:A Survey andSuggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REv.

1601, 1602 (1968). In contrast is the perception that U.S. litigants have more difficulty in obtaining
enforcement and recognition of their American judgments outside the United States. See ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE (Charles Platto ed., 1989).

37. Comity is defined as:
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But

it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive
orjudicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of

other persons who are under the protection of its laws.

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1985); accordCunard S.S. Co. v. Salem Reefer Servs., 773
F.2d 452, 456-60 (2d Cir. 1985).
38. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at204-05; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 481-482 (1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 98 cmt. d (West Supp. 1988). Due to the federal system in the United States, some commentators
point out that American courts have extensive experience in granting recognition and enforcement
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Nonetheless, the perception remains among some non-U.S. parties that courts
in the United States remain hostile to recognition of foreign bankruptcies. For
example, U.S. courts have been accused of ignoring principles of equity in the
treatment of similarly situated creditors and notions of judicial economy that
would be realized by having a single administration of an international bankruptcy
estate.39

As indicated above, section 304 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (section
304) permits the representative of a foreign proceeding to commence an ancillary
case in a U.S. bankruptcy court, to obtain orders from that court to protect assets

of a foreign debtor in the United States, to facilitate the orderly administration
of the debtor's assets, and to prevent dismemberment of the estate. 40 Despite the

fact that section 304 reflects a significant change in the law that permits, under
appropriate circumstances, the de facto single administration of a worldwide
bankruptcy estate, some commentators nonetheless criticize it because they be-

lieve it provides too much discretion to the bankruptcy judge to refuse a petition
seeking relief in an ancillary proceeding. 41 However, this criticism may be misplaced because it fails to acknowledge that it is unusual for a state's bankruptcy
courts to refuse to enforce the orders of a foreign bankruptcy court based upon
considerations similar to those embodied in section 304.42
In addition to lending judicial assistance under section 304, the United States
to "foreign'"-that is sister state-judgments and thus it is natural for them to extend that experience
to judgments from foreign countries. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money
Judgments Abroad and What to Do About It, 42 IowA L. Rav. 236, 240 (1957); cf. Robert B. Von
Mehren, Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in the United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1977) (the
development of American law on foreign judgment recognition and enforcement is routed in the full
faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution).
39. Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 2; In re Toga Mfg., 28 B.R. 165, 167 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1983). Other commentators maintain the U.S. courts have been the most tolerant in recognizing
foreign bankruptcy adjudications due to the existence of section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Professor Reisenfeld, comment at the panel discussion of the Private International Law Committee
of the ABA Section on International Law and Practice, San Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 9, 1992). Although
judicial decisions in U.S. bankruptcy courts have, upon occasion, demonstrated favoritism towards
local creditors, often such bias has been explicitly implemented in the municipal law of many states.
See generally Nadelmann, Treaties, supra note 2 (reviews municipal laws of various Latin American
countries that have explicitly favored local creditors in the distribution of local assets).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (1988) (involuntary petition by foreign representative); 11 U.S.C.
§ 304 (1988) (ancillary proceeding); Koreag, Controle et Revision, S.A. v. Refco F/X Associates,
Inc. (In re Koreag, Controle et Revision, S.A.), 961 F.2d 341, 348 (2d Cir. 1992). Section 304 has
been the subject of numerous commentaries. See, e.g., Gropper, supra note 1, at 49; Melnik, supra
note 1, at 225.
41. See, e.g., Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA) § 2 (drafted by Committee J of the International Bar Association) (published in the materials presented at the American Bar
Association program on Multinational Commercial Insolvency, Toronto, Canada, May 1993). The
comment to section 2 of MIICA emphasizes that some practitioners involved with Committee J believe
that enumeration of the factors to be considered in granting relief under section 304 accords too much
discretion to the bankruptcy judge. See also Melnik, supra note 1, at 239.
42. See, e.g., Felixstowe Dock & Ry. Co. v. United States Lines, [1989] 1 Q.B. 360.
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Code also permits a foreign representative to file an original proceeding in the
United States. A foreign representative may commence an original case if he
seeks to utilize substantive and procedural U.S. bankruptcy law such as the
automatic stay against any actions against the debtor or its property, the worldwide
jurisdiction asserted by the bankruptcy court, and the trustee's avoidance
powers.
Although the United States Bankruptcy Code does not confer automatic recognition and enforcement of all foreign bankruptcy adjudications, it does permit the

most extensive functional harmonization of bankruptcy laws available today. In
that regard it represents a functional paradigm for other states to consider in
any effort to reform their municipal bankruptcy laws and thereby enhance the

opportunity for harmonization of international bankruptcy cases and practices.
B.

BANKRUPTCY LAWS REPRESENT FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL POLICIES

As mentioned above, an advocate of harmonization must recognize that bankruptcy laws address fundamental economic and social issues, and the treatment
of these issues under one state's laws may be fundamentally different from the
treatment under another state's laws.44 Consequently, any effort to harmonize
bankruptcy laws and practice is unlikely to be successful unless these fundamental
economic, legal, and political policies (for example, preferential treatment of

local creditors) are identified by all parties. Moreover, reaching a consensus on
how to accommodate these policy differences, alone, will not eliminate all barriers

to harmonization. Instead, basic structural differences between states' legal systems also will have to be eliminated or otherwise accommodated to avoid disharmony in practice.45 Elimination of these barriers will be especially difficult where
the legal regimes of the states are fundamentally different. Differences, for example, arising from the civil law tradition of one state and the common law tradition

43. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (involuntary petition under either ch. 7 or ch. 11 authorized) and §
301 (voluntary petition under either ch. 7 or ch. 11).
44. Cuning, NationalandInternationalHarmonization:PersonalPropertyLaw, in COMMERCIAL
AND CONSUMER LAW FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 471 (King ed., 1986). Although this

article addresses specific issues implicated in harmonizing personal property security law, particularly
between Canadian provinces, its observations are relevant to a discussion of the harmonization of
international bankruptcy laws. Like personal property security laws, one of the purposes of municipal
bankruptcy laws is the promotion of commercial activities by protecting creditors' expectations for
the business transaction particularly from a creditors' rights theory of bankruptcy, thereby assuring
a degree of predictability. Moreover, the Canadian experience in attempting to harmonize personal
property security law is instructive because it involved an effort to accommodate the fundamental
differences between the common law tradition of its English-speaking provinces and the French civil
law tradition of Quebec.
45. Id.
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of another is a recurring problem that admits no easy solution.4 Resolution of a
seemingly irretractable conflict between the civil law and common law traditions
may require adoption by a state of a new legal principle or mechanism that is
compatible with a fundamental legal principle held by the other state.47

Ultimately, a proponent of harmonization must accept that the differences in
the substantive bankruptcy laws of the states involved in any effort to harmonize
bankruptcy laws and practices impose real limits on the degree of harmonization
that can reasonably be expected. Therefore a working knowledge of the bank-

ruptcy laws of the other states involved is necessary before an advocate can
understand the possible and the probable outcomes of any harmonization effort.
1. Protection of Local Creditors
Although many municipal laws and policies provide that all creditors, including

foreign creditors, should receive equal treatment under local law, practice may
stray from policy in this area. 4' Distribution of a debtor's assets has too often
meant that local creditors have been favored over foreign creditors either as a
matter of municipal law or judicial policy. 49 Discriminatory treatment of foreign
creditors imposes a fundamental barrier to the recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment when the enforcing court determines that discriminatory treatment has been accorded local creditors by the adjudicating court, especially if
such conduct disadvantaged citizens of the enforcing court.50
46. For a thorough discussion of the differences between the bankruptcy laws of England, the
United States, and various European states, see DALHUISEN, supra note 2, §§ 2.05 etseq. The chances
of unifying these laws, except between states sharing close historical, cultural, economic, and political
ties, seems doubtful. Even the efforts of the European Community in the area of bankruptcy cooperation have been directed at allocating jurisdiction among various national courts, which then would
apply municipal law according to certain rules of private international law as modified by treaty.
47. Cuming, supra note 44, at 486-87. The conclusions of the Quebec Civil Code Revision
Commission concerning the proposed Canadian Personal Property Security Act are indicative of the
flexibility required for successful harmonization of laws between states with different legal traditions.
After reviewing this proposed revision of personal property security laws, the Commission concluded
that its basic concept-'"security interests' '-did not represent a mere embodiment of common law
mortgages or equitable charges. Instead, the Commission concluded that the concept of "security
interest" corresponded closely with the civil law concept of "hypothec," and that this "security
interest" evidenced an adoption by Canadian common law jurisdictions of the concept of hypothecs.
Consequently, the Commission concluded that Quebec could move toward a greater degree of harmonization of its laws with the laws of other jurisdictions in this area.
48. See, e.g., Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 2, at 307; Nadelmann, Herstatt, supra note 11, at
1; Nadelmann, CreditorEquality, supra note 2.

49. See, e.g., Felixstowe Dock & Ry. Co. v. United States Lines [1989] 1 Q.B. 360 (Hirst, J.,
declined to set aside the Mareva injunction and thereby permit English assets to be removed from
the jurisdiction of the English court and to be subject to a U.S. bankruptcy court restraining order
staying all claims against the debtor. The court noted that, in light of the fact that several states had
already seized assets, the detriment to local creditors that would occur as a result of setting aside the
Mareva injunction outweighed any benefit to the debtor and its estate), cited in Gropper, supra note
2, at 60.
50. Cf.Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of MN Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1988), aff'd, 878 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1989) (motion by foreign representative to dismiss involuntary
ch. 7 case denied, and section 304 petition not granted; the court noted that, because the Australian
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Likewise, an express policy favoring local creditors will pose a significant
problem where two primary cases are pending, and the different local laws applicable to the debtor represent fundamentally different bankruptcy principles."
For instance, if the debtor's compliance with one court's orders compels it to
discriminate against nonlocal creditors, such compliance may have planted the
seeds for eventual nonrecognition of a critical judgment by a court in the forum
in which the disadvantaged creditors reside or do business. Yet failure to comply
with the order or judgment of the first court unquestionably would result in some
sort of sanction against the debtor.
Finally, harmonizing a municipal law that mandates discriminatory treatment
of foreign creditors with other states' laws will be exceedingly difficult in the
context of any treaty negotiations. Only abandonment or limitation on such discriminatory treatment would appear acceptable to states whose municipal laws
are de jure blind to distinctions between creditors or claims based upon nationality
or citizenship.
2. Similarity of Municipal Laws
A fundamentally different barrier to harmonization exists where states have
superficially similar substantive bankruptcy laws. For example, the fact that
most municipal bankruptcy laws address common issues (such as the opening
formalities of bankruptcy cases, the amenability of certain persons and entities
to the bankruptcy laws, the filing of claims and distribution of assets in connection
therewith, the powers of trustees, receivers, or liquidators, and avoidable transfers) may lull one into perceiving a false harmony between the bankruptcy laws
and practices of several states.52 This superficial harmonization between particular
municipal bankruptcy laws and policies is deceptive and actually masks the complex procedural and substantive problems in an international insolvency case that
practitioners must resolve.53 Conversely, the more similar two states' bankruptcy
policies are, the more likely their laws can be harmonized through the treaty
process. 4

bankruptcy law failed to accord equal treatment to that which the U.S. creditors would receive under
U.S. bankruptcy law, a full case would be commenced in the United States and all U.S. assets would
be administered by the court in that case).
51. Gitlin & Silverman, supra note 1, at 10.
52. See generally DALHUIS N, supra note 2, § 2.05 (discussing the differences between bankruptcy laws on these and other matters, and the choice of law issues related to harmonizing them).
These fundamental differences between bankruptcy laws are not confined to obvious differences
between the civil law and the common law. For a brief discussion ofthe differences between bankruptcy
laws in the United States and England concerning priorities and calculation of claims, see Gitlin &
Silverman, supra note 1, at 10.
53. See generally Gitlin & Silverman, supra note 1, at 9-19.
54. Honsberger, supra note 2 (although the U.S. -Canadian treaty was not ratified, recognition
of the different bankruptcy policies reportedly was not the barrier).
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ECONOMIC AND OTHER PRACTICAL FACTORS AFFECTING HARMONIZATION

The success of any effort to harmonize international bankruptcy laws and
practice requires an advocate to pay special attention to certain economic and
practical factors that comprise real barriers to this process.
First, given the amount of time and effort necessary to achieve de jure harmonization in the area of international bankruptcy laws and practice, an advocate must
ascertain whether harmonization is a matter of importance to relevant business
and professional groups.55 If it is not, either the effort must be abandoned or these
groups must be persuaded that they will benefit from harmonization of laws
affecting their businesses.
Second, the history of efforts to promote cooperation in international insolvency
and bankruptcy matters demonstrates that success generally occurs only between
states with significant commercial relations with each other.56 Although similarity
in legal principles and legal systems can enhance efforts to harmonize bankruptcy
laws and practices, commercial necessity is essential and may help counterbalance
legal parochialism. 57 Nonetheless, as the barren efforts of the European Economic
Community in this area demonstrate, economic integration and commercial ties
alone do not assure success in harmonizing bankruptcy laws.
Third, any effort to harmonize bankruptcy laws of different states must focus
on what is achievable. This pragmatic approach means that one should be concerned not only with reaching a resolution of issues that will be accepted by states
involved (and enacted into domestic law if necessary), but also a resolution that
actually will be implemented by the relevant business communities of the states
involved.58
Fourth, if the states involved do not share the same legal systems, the success
of their efforts will be enhanced by taking a "functional" approach in efforts to
harmonize their laws. That is, rules should be determined by the nature of the
transactions at issue and the economic and social policies deemed desirable by the
parties involved. 59 One advantage of this "functional" approach is that it permits
the parties to examine the major legal issues without being constrained by prior
legal concepts and allows commercial and practical factors to exert an increased
influence.
Fifth, success in drafting treaties or uniform laws increases when the parties
use neutral or a-national language that does not contain concepts or terms peculiar
to a particular municipal law. 6°
55. Cuming, supra note 44, at 471.

56. See generally Nadelmann, Treaties, supra note 2; cf. Cuming, supra note 44, at 480.
57. Cuming, supra note 44, at 480.
58. Bonell, supra note 10, at 866.
59. Cuming, supra note 44, at 487 (quoting the Secretary General in his 1980 Report to UNCITRAL discussing the merits of the approach taken towards security interests in art. 9 of the Uniform

Commercial Code).
60. Bonell, supra note 10, at 873; see also Honsberger, supra note 2, at 299-300.
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Sixth, experience suggests that the degree of harmonization of laws achieved
in the international arena varies inversely with the scope of the goal selected.61
In essence, a more narrow goal may be expected to result in a higher degree of
unity. Consequently, focusing efforts on either rationalizing the allocation of
jurisdiction between national courts or obtaining uniformity in private international law provisions between states may be more likely to result in actual
agreements among states. These practical goals may be more realistic than attempting to unify substantive bankruptcy laws by demanding that states with long
legal traditions substantially amend their laws. 62
States that are emerging from socialist or centralized economic systems and
embracing more market-oriented economies may be more open to wholesale
reforms of their bankruptcy laws. These states' bankruptcy laws may require
substantial revision to function effectively in international commerce. Therefore,
enactment of comprehensive model bankruptcy laws may achieve significant
harmonization of international bankruptcy laws and practices among these
states. 63
Seventh, a fundamental barrier to the harmonization of international bankruptcy
laws and practice is the assumption by many policy-makers in government that
bankruptcy is an aspect of private law and, consequently, the state has only a
peripheral interest in it. 64 Typically, except when a state holds a priority claim
(for example, a revenue claim) in a particular case, it too often believes that its
involvement in bankruptcy matters should be limited to supervision of judicial
proceedings and establishment of the rules of procedure. Consequently, negotiation of bankruptcy treaties traditionally has not enjoyed a high priority for govern65
ments, and they often do not have any policy dealing with such negotiations.
Moreover, the dearth of bankruptcy treaties and the failure of recent efforts in
this area are not encouraging. Nonetheless, in light of the increased importance of
international trade and the resulting increase in international insolvency problems,
negotiations among the Member States of the European Community suggest an
increased awareness of the importance of cooperation in international insolvency
matters. 66
61. Cuming, supra note 44, at 485.
62. But see id., wherein the author asserts a widespread agreement that harmonization of conflict
of laws rules is not sufficient and that structural changes in each state's substantive laws is necessary,
especially in the area of personal property security laws.
63. For example, as part of the Central and East Europe Law Initiative (CEELI) project of the
American Bar Association, this author has reviewed the proposed bankruptcy laws for Bulgaria and
Russia. In each instance, the laws contain provisions that may be cumbersome in efficiently and
equitably distributing assets to creditors while also permitting reorganization of viable enterprises.
Consequently, these states might benefit from access to model bankruptcy codes that account for the
progression of civil law in the field over the last fifty years.
64. Honsberger, supra note 2, at 291.
65. See, e.g., Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 2; Honsberger, supra note 2, at 291.
66. Letter from Michael Prior (Aug. 3, 1992) (on file with the author) (concerning the status of
the second draft EC Convention on Bankruptcy).
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Eighth, the treatment of revenue claims of foreign governments also represent
a fundamental barrier to cooperation in international bankruptcy cases. As a
general proposition, courts will not enforce foreign revenue claims. Therefore,
improving cooperation in international bankruptcy cases requires finding a means
to deal with governmental revenue claims. These claims, for example, could be
dealt with either by adjusting their priority for purposes of receiving a distribution
or by limiting distributions to no more than a certain percentage of the total value
of an estate. If some compromise cannot be negotiated, courts can be expected
to continue their refusal to enforce such revenue claims entirely. 67 In that event,
expecting governments to cooperate in efforts to harmonize international bankruptcy laws and practices may be unrealistic.
IV. The Alternative Approaches to Achieve Harmonization
There are three alternative approaches to promote harmonization in international insolvency and bankruptcy law and practice: First, ad hoc cooperation in
particular insolvency and bankruptcy cases; second, negotiation of bankruptcy
treaties to harmonize international law and practice and allocate jurisdiction
among states having a significant relationship to a particular debtor and its assets;
and third, enactment of model bankruptcy codes as municipal law by numerous
and commercially significant states. The observation of one leading commentator
remains apt:
International bankruptcy law is a catchphrase for the rules that are supposed to govern
the case of the insolvent debtor who has assets in more than one country. Absent a
treaty-and there are few in this area of the law-each legal system acts as it sees fit.
Ideally, all creditors are supposed to share equally in the assets of a debtor's estate. But
for reasons which are sometimes clear and sometimes6 obscure, local creditors often
obtain more than an equal share from the local assets.
Regardless of which of these approaches is employed, an advocate must address
the particular issues and overcome the barriers to harmonization discussed in the
preceding parts of this article. The remainder of this article examines each approach in more detail.

67. Cf. Honsberger, supra note 2, at 291 (noting that priority rules for distribution of assets do
not generally apply to claims of the government); Overseas Inns S.A.P.A. v. United States, 685 F.
Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (although the U.S. Government had prior notice of a plan in Luxembourg
that would pay only 23.49% of the U.S. revenue claim and it did not object, the district court refused
to extend comity to the Luxembourg court's decree and thereby did not recognize and enforce the
judgment). The necessity to deal with revenue claims also has been stressed by Professor Reisenfeld,
of Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California-Berkeley, and former Counselor to the U.S.
State Department in connection with the Canadian-U.S. negotiations concerning a draft bankruptcy
treaty. Conversation with Stefan Reisenfeld (Aug. 11, 1992).
68. Nadelmann, Herstatt, supra note 11, at 1.
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THE AD Hoc APPROACH: THE EMERGING COMMON LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE

Although most commentators decry the paucity of bankruptcy treaties among
major trading states, 69 the necessity for cooperation in contemporary international
insolvency and bankruptcy cases is so overwhelming that cooperation on a caseby-case basis has emerged as the de facto norm. As one participant in recent
international insolvencies has observed:
In the absence of formal treaties to address the problems arising from international
insolvencies, the task falls to the shoulders of insolvency practitioners to develop on a
case by case basis strategies and techniques for resolving the conflicts that arise when
different nations attempt to apply different laws and enforce different requirements upon
the same set of parties. 70
The fact that the United States is not a party to any bankruptcy treaties means
that resolution of the complex procedural and substantive problems characterizing
international insolvency and bankruptcy cases continues to be an ad hoc affair for
U.S. creditors and debtors . 7 ' Typically, this ad hoc approach involves negotiating
an agreement, which is approved by the courts having jurisdiction over the debtor
and its assets, to coordinate concurrent cases commenced in different national
courts and allocating some, but not all, authority over issues between these
courts. 72 This approach is a primary source of an evolving "international common
law of bankruptcy," which, arguably, constitutes an embryonic customary international bankruptcy law.
In recent years, the filing of concurrent bankruptcy cases in the United States
by Axona International Credit & Commerce Limited, Maxwell Communications
Corporation plc, Olympia & York, L.J. Hooker, and the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI) demonstrates that these debtors have relied upon
the bankruptcy law of the United States as the means to impose ad hoc harmonization on their affairs. In essence, they have utilized the U.S. bankruptcy laws either
to shield their assets from creditors' demands in other states or to impose a
practical harmony (albeit limited) on the conflicting demands of the bankruptcy
laws of several states.73
This ad hoc approach is not new. The first prominent manifestation of this
approach to international financial disasters may have been the vigorous interven-

69. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
70. Gitlin & Silverman, supra note 1, at 11-12.
71. See id. at 9.
72. See generally INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL STRATEGIES (PLI No.

628, 1992); Riesenfeld, supra note 2.
73. These cases all reflect a trend towards concurrent, primary cases in more than one jurisdiction,
with the courts in these cases creating ad hoc procedural orders directed towards preserving the going
concern value of the worldwide estate and assuring equitable distribution of the assets of this estate.
See, e.g., Gitlin & Silverman, supra note 1; Quittner, supra note 14.
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tion of Pope Boniface VIII in 1302 to the collapse of the Ammanati Bank of
Pistoja.7 4 In the Ammanati affair Papal intervention was compelled by the necessity of a coordinating authority to assure (to the degree possible) that all assets
were administered for the benefit of all creditors, regardless of the state in which
they resided, and to avoid piecemeal dismemberment of the bankrupt's estate.75
As the only sovereign capable of exercising influence outside its territory, the
Papacy was in a unique position to impose order and to promote international
cooperation. A pragmatic solution was devised in response whereby, in exchange
for the cooperation of the owners of the bank in collecting its debts, the Papal
Court assured the safe passage of the bank's owners back to Rome.76 Additionally,
letters rogatory were issued to clergy in various states concerning the collection
of debts owed to the bank. Thus, the far-flung financial system of the Papacy was
used to collect and transfer monies to Rome for eventual distribution among all
creditors.
The immediate and critical threats to the financial system of Europe posed by
the Ammanati affair and the Papal response appear strikingly contemporary. The
Papal response was, essentially, the same solution devised by the regulatory and
judicial authorities in the various states affected by the recent BCCI collapse. The
coordinated and worldwide response by various national bank regulators to the
BCCI situation stemmed from their realization that if BCCI were permitted to
continue its operations without restraint or if the various national regulators and
judicial authorities failed to take coordinated international action, both individual
creditors and national economic systems faced a financial disaster of staggering
proportion and consequences. In order to prevent further damage to their national
economies and the worldwide financial system, and to afford the time necessary
to determine the validity and amount of claims held by over a million creditors,
the bank regulators entered into agreements and the judiciary of various states
entered orders that prevented individual creditors from seizing assets or otherwise
taking actions that threatened a global solution.77
74. Nadelmann, Treaties, supra note 2, at 59. This article's description of the Ammanati bank
failure and the response of the Papacy is derived from Nadelmann's treatment of it in his seminal
article.
75. Id. at 58-59. The necessity for a coordinated international response to the collapse of the
Ammanati Bank was premised on several circumstances: the bank had branches in several countries
of Europe; many members of the Papal Court were important clients of the bank, and thus its failure
would significantly affect the Papacy; and assets of the bank were being transferred from Rome to
Pistoja and thus would be out of reach of local creditors.
76. Id. at 59. The Papacy issued an order that forbade the owners of the bank from disposing
of their property and, at the same time, enjoined debtors of the bank from making payments without
authorization of the Holy See. Yet, because the legal authority of the Holy See did not extend to all
countries in which creditors were trying to seize assets and in which the principal debtors of the bank
resided, this papal order was not, alone, sufficient to resolve this problem.
77. Ronald DeKoven, The BCCl Case-Opinion and Order, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES:
DEVELOPING PRACTICAL STRATEGIES 305, 310 (PLI No. 628, 1992). In this case the court stated that
the BCCI collapse affected over 1,000,000 depositors worldwide and that BCCI was characterized
by mismanagement, self-dealing, and fraud. Recognizing the severity of the problems, and in light
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Even in cases lacking the apparent massive fraud characterizing BCCI, practitioners with recent experience in international insolvency and bankruptcy cases
are confronted with the same basic jurisdictional and enforcement issues. Even if
an ad hoc approach effectively coordinates administration of a debtor's worldwide
estate, the risk remains that jurisdictional conflicts, private international law
problems, or the public policy of the enforcing state may ultimately preclude
recognition and enforcement of an adjudicating court's judgments if such enforcement would be detrimental to the responding state's local creditors. This risk of
nonrecognition and nonenforcement of bankruptcy adjudications in foreign courts
represents a fundamental problem that must be resolved if bankruptcy law and
practice are to be truly harmonized. These problems have been addressed, with
limited success, in most bankruptcy treaties. 8
Although the ad hoc approach often yields innovative solutions to the jurisdictional problems that are the basis of decisions by courts not to recognize and
enforce foreign bankruptcy adjudications, the capability of this approach to
achieve widespread harmonization of international bankruptcy law and practice
is limited. First, because these ad hoc solutions constitute only the "law of the
case" their application in subsequent cases is uncertain at best. Because these
cases have no precedential value (except, perhaps, in the jurisdiction in which a
decision is rendered), there is no assurance that the solutions created will be
applied in subsequent cases. Nor, even if they are applied, is there any assurance
that the judgments implementing these solutions in a subsequent case will be
recognized and enforced by a foreign court. Such solutions, no matter how well
reasoned or practical, will have no impact on the unbridled judicial discretion in
the recognition and enforcement of bankruptcy judgments which often is considered a major problem.79
Second, due to the absence of an effective means to compile and disseminate
information concerning the practical solutions developed, application of these
solutions in subsequent cases, and in planning commercial transactions, may be
limited.as Nonetheless, this limitation should not be permitted to depreciate the
of the intervention of public authorities in England, Luxembourg, the Cayman Islands, the United
States, and the State of New York, Judge Keenan held that "[t]his Court will not sanction any
interference in this global resolution of all the controversies involving BCCI in the United States."
Id. at 325.
78. See, e.g., Gitlin & Silverman, supra note 1, at 10-12; Quittner, supra note 14, at 329-42.
79. MUCA is intended to preclude such judicial discretion as a barrier to recognition and enforcement of bankruptcy judgments. Article 1 of MICA provides that once a bankruptcy case has been
commenced in a competent court, the national courts of other states enacting MUCA would be required
to recognize the jurisdiction of the competent court in the first state. See, e.g., Melnik, supra note
1; cf Adler, supra note 12, at 4.
80. As one commentator has observed in connection with the unification of international law, the
absence of any central repository for national interpretations of an international agreement will
decrease the opportunity for uniform interpretations of that agreement. As a consequence, neither
unification nor harmonization of the law is enhanced. See Bonell, supranote 10, at 865. In the absence
of any such central repository for information, dissemination of any lessons learned will be limited
to practitioners and scholars who may be aware of professional programs dealing with such cases.
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real conceptual and practical contributions being made by practitioners in these
international cases. Instead, the educational efforts of the bankruptcy and insolvency bar and related professions in this area should be expanded to educate all
interested parties about these solutions to real problems. In that way governments
may address harmonization in a more systematic manner by negotiating and
ratifying bilateral and multilateral bankruptcy treaties among major trading partners and by promoting the drafting of model laws and their enactment into the
municipal law of states that are now converting to more free market economies.
Third, because ad hoc solutions cannot be relied upon in future cases, one might
argue that they are unlikey to have any significant effect on structuring commercial
transactions. Because the parties to a transaction cannot reasonably predict
whether these solutions will be implemented in the event of a bankruptcy or
insolvency proceeding in the future, they will not consider them in structuring a
transaction. However, it may be as valid to question whether any significant
bankruptcy planning occurs in structuring commercial transactions. Nonetheless,
introducing even limited predictability of outcomes remains a valid goal for any
harmonization effort and has been one of the prime goals for all bankruptcy
treaties that have been negotiated to date. Unfortunately, because these practical
problems have not been institutionalized by treaties or uniform municipal laws,
the effectiveness of the emerging "international common law of bankruptcy"
remains limited.
Moreover, even if one believes that an ad hoc approach is inevitable and,
perhaps, the only effective approach to handle the mega-cases that are occurring
with increasing frequency in the international arena, its utility in other cases
may be questioned. One may surmise that in international cases that have lesser
potential to harm national economic systems or that have smaller bankruptcy
estates to distribute, the transactional costs of negotiating complex agreements
allocating jurisdiction among courts or handling specific claims or assets will
render this ad hoc approach inefficient and unavailable as a practical matter.
These criticisms represent too narrow a view of the evolution of the law in this
area and ignore actual practice. The "international common law of bankruptcy"
that is evolving on an ad hoc basis in the large international bankruptcy cases
does exert a real influence on harmonization of international bankruptcy law and
practice.81 This "international common law of bankruptcy" provides practical
solutions to fundamental jurisdictional and other problems that are being employed by practitioners in subsequent cases. Not only are these practical solutions
being employed by practitioners, they may well represent an evolving customary

81. Practitioners in the field increasingly rely on this "international common law of bankruptcy"
in developing practical solutions in handling multinational bankruptcy cases. Thomas C. Given,
Comment at the panel discussion on Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and Practice
sponsored by the International Creditors' Rights and Bankruptcy Committee, ABA Section of International Law and Practice, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 29, 1993).
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international law in this area that could be embodied in international treaties on
bankruptcy cooperation and thereafter be codified in municipal law.8 2 Thus, despite the unlikelihood that these solutions will be accorded any stare decisis effect,
they are helping to define the customary international law in this area.
Despite its inherent limitations, this approach constitutes a laboratory for developing practical solutions that may be employed in future cases. It also permits
identification of other problems and solutions that should be addressed by the
international business community, the bankruptcy and insolvency bar, and associated professions. The source of empirical information concerning the frequency
and economic dimensions of international bankruptcy problems could be useful
in convincing governments of necessity to rectify the lack of harmonization of
law in this area. 3

B.

THE TREATY APPROACH: PREDICTABILITY, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND FINALITY

Arguably, incorporating many of the solutions developed in the de facto approach into bankruptcy treaties between major trading partners offers the most
efficient and widespread means to harmonize international bankruptcy laws and
practice. Once ratified by major commercial states and trading partners, it would
permit reduction of the injustice, inconvenience, frustration, and unpredictability
associated with international insolvencies."
1. JurisdictionalIssues
The jurisdictional and other issues that must be considered in achieving harmonization through a treaty are complex: Given that denial to recognize and to
enforce foreign judgments often is affected by jurisdictional issues, how should
a treaty resolve these fundamental issues?
Should, for example, the goal of harmonization focus on efficient administration of the estate and thus establish a unified administration of a debtor and its
assets worldwide? If so, will this so-called competence directe approach eliminate
all jurisdictional conflicts? Or will it actually precipitate forum shopping or a rush
82. For example, in In re Maxwell Communications Corp., plc, Case No. 91-B-15741 (TLB),
Judge Brozman of the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, entered an order
that allocates authority between the examiner appointed by the court, and the joint administrators
appointed by the English High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Companies Court. Presumably,
this order will reduce the likelihood that either court's judgments or orders will not be recognized
and enforced. This particular solution could stimulate ideas concerning procedural rules that might
be incorporated into international bankruptcy treaties. For a copy of this order, see Gitlin & Silverman,
supra note 1.
83. The absence of current empirical data concerning the frequency and magnitude ofinternational
bankruptcy cases, and the states whose courts are most often involved, leaves one to speculate on
these issues. This void in information is similar to the situation in connection with recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States. See Adler, supra note 12.
84. Honsberger, supra note 2, at 290.
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to commence a case so as to deprive a particular jurisdiction from exercising
jurisdiction over a debtor or certain assets? How will important bankruptcy policy
issues of the nonforum states be accommodated if the lex fori governs all substantive issues? Should, as a result, some rights be determined by foreign law, and
85
if so, what rights should be accorded such treatment?
Alternatively, should these jurisdictional issues be resolved by according two
or more states' courts concurrent jurisdiction, and by such identification define
which bankruptcy adjudications will qualify for recognition in the other state's
courts? 86 Should the efficiency of a single court administration be tempered by this
so-called competence indirecteapproach, which permits concurrent jurisdiction in
several states as a means to protect the public policy interests of all states affected
by an insolvency such as particular treatment of local assets or protection of local
creditors?
In considering these alternative jurisdictional approaches, the effectiveness of
any bankruptcy treaty will turn on its capability to increase the predictability that
bankruptcy adjudications rendered by a "competent court" will be recognized
and enforced by other states' courts. A court's decision whether to recognize and
enforce a foreign bankruptcy judgment is based upon its determination that the
adjudicating court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue that is the subject of a
judgment, that it applied the proper choice of law rules, and that enforcement will
not compromise fundamental public policies of the enforcing state.
Simply put, a primary measure of the effectiveness of a bankruptcy treaty will
be its ability to assure the extraterritorial effect of certain bankruptcy adjudications
so as to promote predictability of result, efficient administration and equitable
distribution of the estate, and finality of results. 7 This extraterritorial effect can
be accomplished in one of two ways. First, a treaty could establish its own special
rules of jurisdiction regarding bankruptcy matters that permit a bankruptcy case
to be commenced (or a debtor to be adjudicated bankrupt) in a signatory state only
by the tribunal accorded bankruptcy jurisdiction by the treaty.8 8 In this competence
directe approach only one court has jurisdiction in a case and that designated court
supersedes all of the usual rules of jurisdiction. This approach would create
exclusive jurisdiction at the domicile or principal place of business of the debtor
and confer exclusive jurisdiction over all estate assets, wherever situated. It has
85. Such an approach, the so-called compLtence directe approach, is found in several European
bankruptcy treaties and was at the heart of the abandoned 1980 Draft Bankruptcy Convention of the
European Economic Community (the EEC Draft Bankruptcy Treaty). See DALHUISEN, supra note
2, § 2.04[5], at 3-262. Reportedly, this newest version of an EEC treaty has abandoned this approach
in favor of the compdtence indirecte approach.
86. This competence indirecte approach is used in the Scandinavian Treaty (art. 13) and the Model
Hague Conference Treaty of 1925 (art. 1 & 2). See DALHUISEN, supra note 2, § 2.04[5], at 3-266.
87. For a detailed discussion of the recognition and enforcement of bankruptcy judgments, see
notes 12-43 supra and accompanying text.
88. See Nadelmann, Treaties, supra note 2, at 72; DALHUISEN, supra note 2, at 3-262;
Honsberger, supra note 2, at 295.
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the advantage of avoiding the inefficiency and waste associated with concurrent
bankruptcy cases and could reduce forum shopping, at least among the debtors
subject to the jurisdiction of the contracting states. However, from a creditor's
point of view, this approach may be disadvantageous because it may require that
a creditor file claims (or, for example, an involuntary bankruptcy petition against
a debtor) in a foreign court. Not only would this requirement be inconvenient,
but its expense may discourage creditors from utilizing the bankruptcy system.
Further, this approach may not be flexible enough to accommodate important
policy differences inherent in the particular substantive bankruptcy laws of the
signatory states because it may be difficult to bifurcate the lex fori under this
approach. 89
Alternatively, a treaty may provide extraterritorial effect only for the bankruptcy adjudications declared by a court specified in the treaty, and adjudications
declared by any court would have no extraterritorial effects. 9° This competence
indirecte approach allocates jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters between specified
courts while permitting concurrent bankruptcy cases to be commenced in two or
more contracting states. 91 A treaty employing this approach would define which
local bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction, and consequently, a judgment rendered
by a competent court would be more likely to be accorded recognition and enforcement by other contracting states. This approach has the advantage of permitting
important policy differences between contracting states' bankruptcy laws to be
taken into account in any particular case by permitting a second case to be commenced. Nevertheless, the duplication of efforts may impose delays and increases
costs for a debtor and its estate. 92 This approach has been employed in the Model
1925 Hague Convention, the Scandinavian Treaty (article 13), and the FrenchItalian Treaty (article 20), and, reportedly, is also now93part of the draft EC
Convention on Bankruptcy being negotiated at this time.
89. DALHUISEN, supra note 2, at 3-262. The French-Swiss Treaty (art. 6), the French-Belgian
Treaty (art. 8), the Belgian-Netherlands Treaty (art. 20), the French-Monaco Treaty (art. 2), the
Belgian-Austrian Bankruptcy Treaty (art. 2(1)), and the abandoned 1980 EEC Draft Bankruptcy
Convention all employ this approach.
90. Nadelmarm, Treaties, supra note 2, at 72; DALHUISEN, supra note 2, at 3-262.
91. Reportedly, the new bankruptcy laws proposed for the Federal Republic of Germany permit
a local creditor to open a concurrent, primary case if it concludes that it will be better treated by
application of local assets to its claim. Conversation with Stefan Reisenfeld (Aug. 11, 1992).
92. DALHUISEN, supra note 2, at 3-262. The underlying policy of this approach is reflected in
section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code. The United States has been described as
the leader in open attitudes towards foreign insolvencies with Section 304 of its Bankruptcy Code offering, on
terms, recognition of all proper foreign insolvency practitioners and their right to call for assets in the U.S.A. to
be dealt with under the laws of the foreign insolvency and, above all, to create one state.

Letter from Michael Prior, supra note 66; see also Michael Prior, Paper presented at the First Biannual
International Seminar on Insolvency and Creditors Rights, Transport Industry Finance and Insolvency
Issues, Recognition of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings, London, England (June 2, 1992).
93. Letter from Michael Prior, supra note 66. The Second Draft EC Convention on Bankruptcy
has been circulated to a restricted number of persons, but reportedly would not change this fundamental
vision. In contrast, the U.S. bankruptcy law offers more than merely an ancillary proceeding to assist
foreign trustees or receivers in collecting assets and administering their estate. A debtor may file a
WINTER 1993

906

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

2. Choice of Law Issues and Private InternationalLaw Issues
In addition to these jurisdictional issues, a bankruptcy treaty could specify the
applicable law to particular categories of issues in international bankruptcy cases.
For example, it could specify when the private bankruptcy law of the lex fori and
when foreign private bankruptcy law apply, and whether the lex fori governs all
issues or whether certain issues will be determined by the lex loci or lex fori
concursus. 94 In instances where a debtor's assets are being administered by two
or more courts that share concurrent jurisdiction, specification of the law to be

applied by the adjudicating court may enhance the recognition and enforcement
of the adjudicating court's bankruptcy judgments by a foreign enforcing court.
Given the complex nature of many international insolvency and bankruptcy cases,

harmonization might be enhanced by permitting parties to contracts to select
procedural rules other than those applicable under the lex fori to govern administration of a unified estate. However, bankruptcy treaties generally have not dealt
with attempts to harmonize procedural issues that may have a significant effect
on the substantive rights of the participants in a bankruptcy case. 95
C. MODEL LAWS: HARMONIZATION THROUGH UNIFORM MUNICIPAL LAWS

1. Fundamental Issues
In light of the fundamental economic, political, and legal changes that have
taken place in the last several years in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, proponents of harmonization of international bankruptcy law and practice
must consider whether a more radical approach should be employed.9 Assuming
full proceeding under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and thereby be accorded all rights provided by the
Code, including the protection of the automatic stay and the application of various avoidance rules,
and the definition of the estate as including all property located worldwide. See Quittner, supra note
14, at 331-33.
94. A discussion of the history of private international law, and the varying formulations of what
properly is encompassed by this concept, is beyond the scope of this article. This area of the law has
been the subject of intense scholarly discussion since the 19th century, and such discussion continues
unabated to this day. See, e.g., Gerhard Kegel, Introduction, in ENCYCLOPEDIA VOL. III, supra note
13, ch. 1.
95. See DA LHUISEN, supra note 2, § § 2.05 et seq. The appointment of the trustee, the formalities
connected therewith, and the trustees' liability generally are not the subject of treaty law and therefore
are left to the lex fori concursus. Id. § 2.05[1], at 3-273 n.8. Likewise, a division of different roles
and powers between the courts, registrars (in common law countries), the delegated judge (in several
civil law countries), and the trustee, liquidators, receivers, or administrators is not customarily the
subject ofexisting treaty law and bankruptcy matters, and the lex fori concursus is normally applicable.
Id. at 3-291 n.9. Treaty law is not normally concerned with creditors' meetings or creditors' influence
in such meetings through committees or otherwise, and voting procedure is determined by the lex
fori. Treaty law tends not to deal with the subject of filing, and the procedural aspects of verifying
claims, and generally refers to the lex fori as applicable in matters of procedure. Id. at 3-308 n. 15.
The execution and sale of foreign assets, especially on the European continent in respect to real
property, is dependent on local formalities and cooperation of local authorities and is traditionally
thought to be the very essence of the problem of foreign bankruptcy recognition. Id. at 3-310. Treaty
law generally accepts the lex loci for execution sales in this regard.
96. Cuming, supra note 44, at 483.
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a consensus could be reached on these jurisdictional and private international law
issues, should the international community abandon (or supplement) its efforts to
negotiate treaties embodying this consensus? Should it, instead, refocus its energies and seek to achieve a functional harmonization by drafting model substantive
bankruptcy laws that would be enacted as municipal law by these countries? If
so, would this new approach render current conflicts concerning private international law and national jurisdiction essentially irrelevant?
A model laws approach utilized by UNCITRAL in many contexts, which is
designed to provide moral suasion and intellectual insight, could achieve significant de facto harmonization because municipal laws would be substantially identical. Achieving harmonization of international bankruptcy law and practice
through drafting model laws would have to address the same issues, and overcome
the same barriers, as efforts to negotiate bankruptcy treaties. In the area of international insolvency and bankruptcy cooperation this approach has been employed
by the International Bar Association in connection with its Model International
Insolvency Cooperation Act (MUCA). Nevertheless, to date, no states have
amended their municipal bankruptcy laws to incorporate the fundamental concepts
of the MIICA, such as single case administration, exclusive jurisdiction in the
adjudicating state, and limits on discretion in denying recognition and enforcement
ofjudgments by any state that enacts this model law. 97 Although proposed changes
in the United States Bankruptcy Code to incorporate the MIlCA's provisions
have been drafted, no serious effort to enact these changes appears to have been
undertaken.98
2. Barriersto Overcome
To be effective in harmonizing international bankruptcy law and practice,
model bankruptcy laws must overcome several barriers. Assuming unification is
the proper goal for international efforts, several fundamental issues must be
resolved.
First, how would such unification come about? Should, for example, an international body (such as the UNCITRAL or the Hague Convention on Private International Law) draft model bankruptcy codes, or should this task be the province of
professional and business groups?
Second, regardless of who the drafters may be, can any model code successfully
blend fundamentally different common law and civil law bankruptcy law principles? 99 More problematically, can a model code derived from common law and
97. According to the chairman of Committee J of the IBA, its efforts now are shifting towards
drafting more comprehensive model bankruptcy codes. Conversation with Michael Prior (July 1992).
98. The proposed changes in title 11 and title 28 of the United States Code that would be necessary
if MUICA's provisions were enacted as part of U.S. bankruptcy law may be found at Melnick, supra
note 1, at 242-62.
99. For a detailed discussion of the differences in national bankruptcy laws, and differences
between common law jurisdictions and civil law jurisdictions generally, see DALHUISEN, supra note
2, §§ 2.05 et seq.
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civil law traditions be reconciled, for example, with modem Islamic legal principles? Likewise, can a model code reconcile fundamentally different notions concerning the nature of the bankruptcy process? Can a model bankruptcy code unify
a judgment approach, a creditors' rights approach, and a general assignment
approach to bankruptcy that may underlay various states' laws? I°°
Third, even assuming drafting model bankruptcy codes is an appropriate activity to undertake, what states do the drafters expect to adopt such codes: The
emerging capitalistic states in Eastern Europe and Africa? The states that formerly
were part of the Soviet Union? Should the goal be more ambitious, anticipating
the revision of municipal bankruptcy laws in Europe, Canada, the United States,
Australia, and Latin America such that conflicts in international bankruptcy cases
will be reduced? Nonetheless, model laws may be very useful in the emerging
states of Eastern and Middle Europe, and the former Soviet Union, which are
embracing more open market economies and reforming their legal systems to
accommodate these economic changes.
Fourth, if the several states enacting a set of model laws have fundamentally
different legal traditions and principles, these model laws may be interpreted
differently despite being substantially identical. The resulting confusion and uncertainty in the application of a model law would reduce the very qualities that
model laws are intended to promote: predictability and uniformity. In that event,
disharmony, rather than harmony, could prevail.
Fifth, delays in enacting enabling legislation in the states involved may render
the proposed laws ineffective. Although the problem of delay also exists where
a treaty is signed but not ratified by a sufficient number of states or enabling
legislation is not enacted, it might be expected that states that have invested time
and energy in negotiating a treaty are more motivated to ratify that treaty. In
contrast, model bankruptcy laws created by international agencies or bar associations may not be enacted promptly because the target states may have no interest
in adopting a set of model laws developed without their active involvement.
Consequently, the likelihood of enactment of a set of model laws would increase
in direct proportion to the active involvement of the target states in framing such
model laws. Therefore, the selection of participants in this process should be as
inclusive as possible, while still permitting the task to be accomplished.
Sixth, unless care is taken to assure that a model law is accurately translated into
the official language of each state, its effectiveness may be materially reduced.'°'
Similarly, use of technical legal terms that have no precise definition in the official
language of an enacting state, or have no corresponding meaning under its legal
principles, pose a significant problem to the effectiveness of any model law.
Finally the degree of worldwide harmonization of bankruptcy law and practice
100. For a detailed discussion of these distinct conceptualizations of the nature of bankruptcy and
their bearing on international cooperation, see id. § 2.01.
101. Bonell, supra note 10, at 866-88.
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that will be achieved through model laws will depend upon the number of states
enacting a model law and the economic value of their commercial transactions
and trade with other states. Given the long established history of bankruptcy laws
in the major trading states of Europe, England and the Commonwealth states,
Latin American states, and the United States, model laws in this area will probably
not be enacted in the municipal laws of these states. As a result, the scope of any
harmonization through enactment of model laws may be expected to be more
regional than worldwide.
V. Conclusion
The current growth of international trade compels all major trading states to
be concerned with harmonization of international bankruptcy laws and practice.
Not only do major international insolvencies affect the private business community; they may threaten the economic and political stability of many states. Codifying in bankruptcy treaties the "international common law of bankruptcy" being
generated on an ad hoc basis represents the most efficient means to satisfy the
common concerns of all participants in any insolvency or bankruptcy matter:
predictability in results, efficiency and equity in distribution of the estate's assets,
and finality.
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